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FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9545
INFO RUEHII/VIENNA IAEA POSTS COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE 0226
RUEHLJ/AMEMBASSY LJUBLJANA IMMEDIATE 0151
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO PRIORITY 0044

S E C R E T UNVIE VIENNA 000260

SIPDIS

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PLS PASS SECDEF TRAVEL TEAM FOR D(S) STEINBERG
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C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (FIXED GARBLED TEXT)
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/04/2019
TAGS: [AORC](#) [PREL](#) [KNNP](#) [IAEA](#) [SP](#) [JA](#) [SI](#) [SF](#) [BE](#)
SUBJECT: IAEA/DG RACE: CAMPAIGN UPDATE FROM AMANO

REF: UNVIE 244 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte for reasons 1.4 b and d

Summary

¶1. (S) Taking stock in advance of the June 9 straw poll, Japanese DG candidate Yukiya Amano provided Ambassador Schulte an update June 5 of Japan's world-wide wide campaign. The GOJ is pulling out all the stops on Amano's behalf, including contacts by PM Aso and at the FM level. Among the undecided, Japan counts Uruguay, Mexico, Germany, Ireland and Romania, while the UK and Russia will not disclose their position. Japan has received encouraging signals from the Turkish FM but Turkey could still defect to Echavarri because of Spain's support of Turkey's eventual EU accession. Japan has also not given up on India and Argentina; PM Aso was scheduled to call his Indian counterpart on June 2 and a FM telcon with Buenos Aires is planned for June 8 or 9 (we encouraged an earlier call.) PM Aso was scheduled to call President Lula on May 27, PM Brown on May 28 and President Medvedev on May 30 and to meet with Chinese President Hu Jintao on June 7. FM telcons were also slated for Uruguay on June 4 and Germany and Mexico on June 5. Amano did not have readouts of these various calls. Japan's lobbying efforts even extend to hard-core Minty supporters, including Egypt, Cuba and Algeria, to support Amano in a "leading candidate" vote or in the event of a Minty withdrawal; to date Japan has not received a positive response. Japan had not been able to send a high-level representative to the OAS Ministerial, but Tokyo is dispatching high-level officials to Vienna; the MFA Director General was just here and a Vice-Minister plans to attend the opening of the June Board meeting. (Spanish FM Moritanos will also be in attendance.)

¶2. (S) Ambassador Schulte updated Amano on U.S. efforts and the responses we have received to date; he advised that countries like Germany and Uruguay needed to be convinced Amano could win. Japan reported that the Uruguayan Ambassador did not have new instructions but Montevideo will support either Amano or Echavarri if the vote shifts in their favor. Ambassador Schulte shared the more cautious Uruguayan line to us -- that Montevideo "is not in Amano's camp for now." Ambassador Schulte reported that the Romanian Ambassador had not been aware of continued U.S. or French support for Amano, and was concerned about the lack of an EU consensus. The Romanian Ambassador confirmed to us June 5 that he remains uninstructed. PM Aso also plans to call his Romanian counterpart. Amano reported that Chinese Ambassador

Tang is characterizing U.S. support for Amano as a Bush Administration position, a misrepresentation which Ambassador Schulte assured would be rectified in our discussions in Beijing and Vienna. End Summary.

Negative Campaigning

13. (S) From the discussion it was also evident that Amano's continued focus is eliminating Spanish candidate Echavarri so as to prompt an Amano-Minty rematch. He denied any negative campaigning on his part but noted that Spain had embarked on a "conquest" strategy focused on India, Russia, China and the Latin American countries, and would seek to woo back the Europeans in the event of a Minty withdrawal. The Spanish have been telling others that if Echavarri made it through the elimination rounds, he could win a runoff against Amano. Amano sniffed that that Spanish Conquistadors may have been able to do this five centuries ago, but Spain lacked the time and capacity to implement such a strategy now. He also accused Belgian candidate Poncelet of negatively campaigning; making the rounds in Latin America, Poncelet has been predicting that Amano will be forced to withdraw and only two Europeans would be left in the race. (Comment: We continue to assess that Poncelet has as little if any support; no one has signaled that they would vote for him. End comment.) The Mexican Mission has approached us in Vienna asking whether Amano will withdraw if he does not do well in the straw poll.

14. (S) Ambassador Schulte and DCM encouraged Amano to keep to the high road, and to make this a campaign about Japan's support of the IAEA and Amano as the most qualified candidate. This would be especially important after the straw poll, they advised.
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Straw Poll

15. (S) Ambassador Schulte also exchanged views on various scenarios and public diplomacy for the June 9 straw poll. Amano reported that both Poncelet and Petric have vowed to stay in the race even if they get zero votes in the poll. While the straw poll may not help winnow the field, Amano said he fully understood that it will shape Board member positions and perceptions about the race. The period after the poll, DCM advised, and leading into the June Board will be critically important as countries seek to interpret the results and speculate on withdrawals. In dealing with the press, Amano agreed with Ambassador Schulte about downplaying the significance of the non-binding poll, given the uncertainty of the result. Amano is taking a low-profile approach and is avoiding press in advance of the poll; if asked, he notes the strengths of all the candidates. Even after the straw poll, whatever the result, Amano will avoid being overly optimistic. Ambassador Schulte noted that the negative impact of possible press narratives following the straw poll -- that Amano's support has diminished since the March vote (he will not get the 22 votes from March), that new candidates are gaining ground or that Minty is holding strong. Amano will not overstate his support and will focus on the number 12 as the minimum number of votes a candidate would need in the elimination rounds of formal voting to ensure placement in the runoff.

Election Date

16. (C) In bilateral consultations June 4, the Board Chair advised Japan that she plans to suggest a date before June 30 (her preference) for the election but expects objections. She was prepared to countenance delaying a day or two, i.e. circa July 1-3, and seeks to conduct the election over two days without long intervals so as to preserve the "integrity" of the vote. Japan indicated flexibility to the Board Chair on this date, and did not insist on having a day or two hiatus between rounds of voting since there are both pros and cons to such a hiatus. Ambassador Schulte said that he would

urge the Board Chair to set a date for the election at the conclusion of the straw poll, as he had recommended in a June 3 WEOG meeting. Japan had encouraged the Board Chair to announce the date "just after" the straw poll.

SCHULTE